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BACKING THE HORSE OR THE JOCKEY?  DUE DILIGENCE, AGENCY 
COSTS, INFORMATION AND THE EVALUATION OF RISK BY BUSINESS 
ANGEL INVESTORS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the argument that business angel investors are more 
concerned with managing and minimising agency risk than market risk. Based on 
data on due diligence process from a survey of business angels in the UK, the 
paper concludes that business angels do view entrepreneur characteristics and 
experience as having the greatest impact on the perceived riskiness of an 
investment opportunity. Further, they emphasise personal and informal over 
formal sources of information in the due diligence process, and seek information 
on both the entrepreneur and the venture in determining valuation. Indeed, the 
reliance of business angels on short-term and subjective information to value 
investment opportunities leads to the conclusion that their approach to valuation is 
not a function of the conventional protocols of financial analysis, but of personal 
relations and assessment. 
 
Key words risk, investment decision-making, due diligence; business angel; 
agency costs 
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BACKING THE HORSE OR THE JOCKEY?  DUE DILIGENCE, AGENCY 
COSTS, INFORMATION AND THE EVALUATION OF RISK BY BUSINESS 
ANGELS 
 
1. Introduction 
Access to informal venture capital, and to non-family business angel investment 
in particular (characterised by market-based not affinity-based decision-making) 
plays an important role in economic development (Avdeitchikova and Nyström 
2016). Accordingly, understanding the nature of their decision-making process 
and the factors that influence it can play a role in improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of this market, in shaping the evolution of policies to support the 
development of the market and in informing entrepreneurs of the factors that are 
most important for them to successfully attract business angel investment. 
 
Studies of investment decision-making by both venture capital fund managers and 
business angels suggest that investors attach significant importance to the ability 
of management, in terms of skill, quality, track record and experience, and other 
characteristics.   Although other factors are also taken into account, including the 
characteristics of the market, industry features, extent of competition, product 
differentiation, rates of return expectations and external threats (Sweeting, 1991; 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Manigart et al, 1997), management-related factors – 
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notably the quality of the entrepreneur - appear to play a major part in the 
investment decision (MacMillan et al, 1985; Muzyka et al, 1996).  Specifically, it 
is becoming clear from a number of so-called ‘third generation’ business angel 
studies1 (Maxwell, 2016; White and Dumay, 2017; Sudek, 2006; Pollack et al, 
2012) that for the angel investor, there is a sequencing in the evaluation and 
decision-making process, in that the assessment of the entrepreneur can only take 
place once the key characteristics of the venture are known (Maxwell, 2011; 
2016; Mitteness et al, 2012b). It is also clear that as the research focus shifts from 
the investor to the deal as the unit of analysis (Kelly, 2007) the reasons for 
rejecting an opportunity vary across different stages in a multi-stage decision 
process (Landström, 1996; Jeffrey et al, 2016). 
 
For a number of commentators this has prompted the use of a racing analogy:  
‘imagine that your product or service is a horse and that your management team is 
the jockey.  A good horse and a skilful jockey is what the betters (investors) are 
looking for’ (Robertson, 2002).  In similar vein, Richards (2001, 61, quoting Bill 
Joos of Garage.com) argues that ‘you have to have a valid race-track, and I view 
                                                 
1 First generation studies (1980s and early 1990s) focused on descriptive profiles of angel capital 
markets, angel investors and their investments; second generation studies (1990s) shifted the focus 
to business angel networks, investment decision making and the application of theory; the third 
generation of studies (after 2000) is characterised by a greater focus on methodological, analytical, 
theoretical and policy issues, following an agenda set out in Mason and Harrison (1999). Progress 
against this third generation agenda, and the emergence of a fourth generation of research focused 
more on the dynamics of market evolution, has been charted by White and Dumay (2017). 
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that as the market. You have to have a wonderful business idea, which is the 
horse, and smart bettors bet on jockeys’.  One of the first substantive research 
studies of venture capital investment decision-making concluded that ‘there is no 
question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds 
(financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines 
whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all’ (Macmillan et al 1985, 119).  
This is confirmed in more recent research (Mason et al, 2016) that suggests that 
concern about the entrepreneur is the overwhelming reason why angel investors 
reject investment opportunities, especially at the early stages of the decision-
making process (Mitteness et al, 2012a; 2012b). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The key point of this analogy is to emphasise the role of the entrepreneur in 
managing risk and generating returns for the investor: ‘you would not bet on a 
race horse that had a four hundred pound gorilla as the jockey’ (Weintraub, 2002).  
However, the argument that the entrepreneur is critical to the decision to invest is 
not unequivocally supported in the literature. Mitteness et al (2012b) identify a 
distinction between studies (Haines et al, 2003; Mason and Harrison, 1996; Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000) arguing that entrepreneur characteristics weigh more heavily 
than opportunity/venture characteristics and those (Fiet, 1995a; Hall and Hofer, 
1993; Kaplan et al, 2009) suggesting that opportunity characteristics take 
precedence. They attribute these conflicting results to differences in the stage of 
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the decision-making process being considered, and to differences in individual 
investor characteristics and preferences (Mitteness et al, 2012a), to which we 
would add that much of this prior literature makes no allowance for the possible 
existence of differences in the assessment of this factor by different categories of 
investors, notably venture capitalists and business angels (Fiet, 1995a; 1995b; 
1996).   
 
In this paper, therefore, we review the relevant literature on the factors 
influencing the investment decisions of business angel investors, and highlight the 
relative paucity of such studies in the business angel market.  Based on this 
review we develop a number of hypotheses concerning the approach of business 
angels to the evaluation of investment opportunities. These hypotheses are then 
tested by means of a detailed study of the relative importance of entrepreneur 
(jockey) and venture (horse) characteristics in business angel investment decision-
making in the UK. 
 
2. Risk and Investment Decision-Making 
Business angel investing is a multistage decision-making process of interaction 
between investors and entrepreneurs under condition of incomplete information 
and risk (Harrison et al, 2015; 2016; Maxwell et al, 2011). Investors in unquoted 
companies encounter two types of risk: market risk and agency risk (Fiet, 1995a; 
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1995b). Market risk, or more generally performance risk (Das and Teng, 2001), 
can be defined as risk that is due to unforeseen external competitive conditions 
affecting the size, growth and accessibility of the market, to factors affecting the 
level of market demand, and to operational factors (e.g. implementation failures, 
technology factors) that might preclude achievement of a venture’s goals and 
objectives. Agency risk, otherwise relationship risk (Maxwell and Lévesque, 
2014), is risk that is caused by the separate and possibly divergent interests of 
principals and agents (Fiet, 1995a; 1995b). It may result from agents acting in bad 
faith, holding conflicting objectives, misrepresenting their skills and abilities, and 
inaptitude. Agency risk arises from information asymmetry: agents possess 
information on the project that is not known to the principals. Information 
asymmetry, in turn, opens the investor up to the risks of moral hazard, whereby 
agents may take advantage of information asymmetry to redistribute resources to 
themselves and therefore to the detriment of the investor, and adverse selection 
which arises from his/her inability to judge whether the entrepreneur has the 
capabilities required.  
 
Fiet (1995a; 1995b) suggests that venture capital fund managers and business 
angels will differ in their attitude to these sources of risk. Specifically, he 
proposes that venture capital fund managers will be more concerned with market 
risk – risk due to unforeseen competitive conditions affecting the size, growth and 
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accessibility of the market - whereas business angels will be more concerned with 
agency risk – that risk arising from the separate interests of the entrepreneur and 
the investor. This difference in the emphasis that venture capital fund managers 
and business angels attribute to these sources of risk is related to the types of risk 
that they believe they are most competent to control (Harrison, et al 2016). 
Venture capital fund managers can use stringent boilerplate contractual provisions 
which allow them to replace an entrepreneur who under-performs, is guilty of 
misconduct or is found to be incompetent, to protect themselves from agency risk 
(Bruton, Fried and Hisrich, 1997; 2000). CEO replacement has been identified as 
a key VC investor contribution during or after the investment process and VC-
backed companies are significantly more likely than others to experience CEO 
removal (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). However, market risk is less controllable 
through ex post contracting.  
 
Business angels, in contrast, attach more importance to agency risk (Harrison et 
al, 2016). First, most angels are information poor, have limited deal flow and lack 
comparative data to evaluate market risk, and hence have fewer opportunities to 
learn from experience (Harrison et al, 2015). Second, angels are resource 
constrained and do not have the same level of resources as venture capital funds 
to both collect and analyse (costly) market-related information (Fiet, 1995b). 
Moreover, the generally smaller deals made by business angels do not justify the 
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higher transaction costs associated with extensive due diligence: research suggests 
that venture capital fund managers do indeed conduct significantly more due 
diligence than business angels (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Third, contracts between 
angels and entrepreneurs tend to be simple and informal, making it harder for 
them to enforce sanctions, reflecting the importance of trust rather than formal 
controls in the angel-entrepreneur relationship (Harrison et al, 1997; Kelly and 
Hay, 2003; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). Finally, given the importance of 
heuristics in their decision making (Harrison et al, 2015), it is clear that many 
business angels rely on their prior entrepreneurial and industry experience and 
feel quite capable of assessing the market risks and so view the relational risk 
associated with the entrepreneur as the most potentially damaging contingency 
(Fiet, 1995a).  
 
The implication is that venture capital fund managers will seek to reduce risk at 
the pre-investment stage by careful screening, due diligence and contracting 
arrangements (Van Osnabrugge, 2000).  Business angels, by contrast, will manage 
risk by placing more emphasis on post-investment relationships, particularly 
through becoming actively involved in the business. In summary, therefore, Fiet 
(1995b: 557) suggests that “…business angels may rely on the entrepreneur to 
evaluate market risk for them. … [This] would allow a business angel to 
specialise in evaluating whether or not the entrepreneur understands the deal and 
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whether or not the entrepreneur can be relied upon as a venture manager, even if 
they as investors do not have enough market information to understand it 
completely. That is, business angels can specialise in evaluating agency risk while 
relying upon the entrepreneur to manage market risk.”  
 
Furthermore, although business angels and venture capital fund managers both 
emphasise the importance of the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team, they stress 
different aspects (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). In particular, angel 
investors place greater importance on the ‘chemistry’ between themselves and the 
entrepreneur, and will use their expertise and involvement to close gaps in the 
management team and contribute to the success of the venture.  According to Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000: 149): ‘their [business angels’] main requirement 
appears to be that they understand the generic business, rather than the sector. This 
understanding allows them to assess how they might add their own general business 
knowledge and experience to the firm.’ In other words, the approach of the majority 
of business angels to minimizing risk is to have a limited investment focus in order 
to leverage their experience and knowledge to evaluate opportunities and add value 
to their investments. As such, this is consistent with other evidence that angel 
investors initially focus on assessing the entrepreneur rather than the business 
(Morrissette, 2007; Haines et al, 2003; Feeney et al, 1999): ‘at the screening stage 
when angel investors are deciding whether an entrepreneur should proceed to due 
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diligence, the angels place the greatest importance on the strength of the 
entrepreneur’ (Mitteness et al, 2012b, 244), and entrepreneur strength rather than 
opportunity strength is more important in predicting whether a deal will proceed to 
due diligence. 
 
Most of the research to date on risk and business angel investment decision 
making, with the exception of the Mitteness et al (2012a; 2012b) studies, focuses 
on the initial screening stage, largely reflecting the relative ease of observing the 
process and collecting data (including the use of real-time methods, Harrison et al, 
2015) relative to later stages in the process. To date there have been no studies 
explicitly of the due diligence stage in the process. Indeed, some have argued that 
once the investor’s assessment of the entrepreneur has proven satisfactory they 
rely ‘on the due diligence team to focus on verifying the information related to the 
opportunity, such as the new venture’s legal position, market prospects and 
references’ (Mitteness et al, 2012b, 244). While this outsourcing of the due 
diligence process, and its emphasis on matters of market, or performance, risk 
may be an appropriate description of the process in formally organised angel 
groups (Sudek, 2006; Gregson et al, 2013) this contradicts the limited knowledge 
we have of this stage in the investment decision making process (Maxwell, 2016). 
For example, angels use a wide range of informal sources to confirm the accuracy 
of the information provided by the entrepreneur (Haines et al, 2003), more 
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experienced angels pay more attention to the entrepreneur than to, for example, 
financial projections (Harrison et al, 2015), and angel investors undertake less due 
diligence when the entrepreneur is introduced to them by a trusted intermediary 
(Harrison et al, 1997). 
 
In this paper we contribute to the angel investment decision making literature by 
examining the due diligence process in detail. Our starting point is the work of 
Fiet (1995a; 1995b), who was concerned with the implications of these 
differences in attitudes to risk for the sources used to acquire risk-reducing 
information. He notes that business angels have less information reliance than 
venture capital funds, particularly for agency risk (Fiet, 1996): they are less 
successful than venture capitalists in consolidating what they know about deals 
with other informants, and information does not flow efficiently among angels 
(Gaston, 1989; Krasner and Tymes, 1983; Seymour and Wetzel, 1983). In this 
paper we test three hypotheses arising from Fiet’s work relating to the effects of 
business angels’ attitude toward agency and market risk on their (post-screening) 
due diligence process. These hypotheses, which follow from the earlier 
discussion, are: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Business angels view the entrepreneur/team as the greatest 
source of risk in an investment opportunity. 
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Hypothesis 2. Business angels will rely much more on themselves rather 
than others to gather and process agency and market risk information. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The information gathering activities of business angels will 
concentrate on entrepreneur-related issues. 
 
 
3. Data Source 
This paper is based on 127 usable responses to a mail questionnaire sent to over 
1,000 business angels who were registered with UK business angel networks 
(BANs)2. These organisations operate like “dating agencies”, providing a 
communication channel which enables business angels to review investment 
opportunities while preserving their anonymity and allows entrepreneurs seeking 
finance to present their investment opportunity to a large number of potential 
investors (Harrison and Mason, 1996). The managers of several BANs agreed to 
distribute questionnaires to investors registered with their service. In addition, 
some questionnaires were sent to investors who were identified through 
                                                 
2 The survey was undertaken in 1999/2000 and remains the only source of information on the due 
diligence process of business angels – this topic has not featured in more recent surveys (e.g. 
Mason and Botelho 2014; Wright et al 2015). Given that in other respects (demographics, 
investment behaviour) our sample is very similar to these more recent ones we believe that 
analysis of this data in this context remains justified. 
14 
 
recommendations and informal contacts. Although we know that some 1000 
surveys were administered, it was not possible to calculate a meaningful response 
rate because not all of these will have been sent to our population of interest. For 
example, the response rate is under-estimated due to double-counting (investors 
may be members of more than one network) and the inclusion of investors 
registered with BANs who are not business angels (e.g. financial institutions, 
companies and intermediaries registering on behalf of their clients). We are not 
able to control for these factors. 
 
This methodology is open to two potential sources of bias. First, it is a “sample of 
convenience”. However, research on the informal venture capital market is 
hampered by the difficulties involved in identifying business angels (Mason and 
Harrison 2008). There are no directories of business angels, their investments are 
not publicly recorded and most strive to preserve their anonymity. Any attempt to 
test the representativeness of a sample of business angels, whether drawn from 
BAN membership lists or from other sources, runs up against the problem that the 
overall population of business angels is unknown and probably unknowable 
(Wetzel, 1983). The risk of significant bias is substantially increased if a sample 
is drawn from just one BAN (Mason and Harrison, 1997), as is the case in a 
number of studies (e.g. Mitteness et al, 2012a; 2012b). To mitigate this potential 
problem in the present study, the sample has been drawn from a number of 
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different types of networks (large and small, local and regional, private and 
public) in various parts of the country. Second, there may be a problem with 
response bias. This could not be tested because no information was available on 
the characteristics of non-respondents. Nor could early and late respondents be 
compared because the various BANs sent out the questionnaires at different times, 
and the research team did not have control over this process. 
 
The survey instrument was designed to capture a wide range of information on the 
investment activity of business angels in the UK: investments made, syndication 
and co-investment, investment appraisal, deal structure, future investment plans, 
attitude towards support and assistance measures and opinions of business angel 
networks (Harrison and Mason, 2000; Mason and Harrison, 1999; 2002). This 
paper is based on questions concerning: (i) factors that influence the riskiness of 
investment opportunities, (ii) due diligence activities and (iii) information sources 
used to value an investment opportunity. These questions replicated those 
included in a survey instrument developed by Wright and Robbie (1995) to 
examine the investment appraisal approach of UK venture capital fund managers.  
However, Wright and Robbie (1995) measured the impact of a range of prompted 
factors on the riskiness of a venture on a scale from 5 ‘extremely important’ to 1 
irrelevant’, which does not differentiate between those factors increasing risk and 
those which decrease risk.  Accordingly, we asked respondents to assess each 
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factor on a five point scale from  –2 ‘reduces risk’ to +2 ‘increases risk’, with 0 
representing ‘no effect on risk’. 
 
 
 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Profile of Respondents 
It is important to emphasise that the respondents to this survey conformed to what 
is the accepted profile of business angels (for a summary, see Van Osnabrugge 
and Robinson 2000, 106-111) rather than what is described in the USA as 
‘doctors and dentists money’ (i.e. passive investors who invest via intermediaries 
and have little or no involvement in either the investment decision or post-
investment support). They were typically hands on investors who invested on 
their own or as part of informal investor syndicates, participated in making the 
investment decision and were involved in supporting their investee businesses. 
The majority (87%) had made one or more investments (33% had made at least 
four investments) and the remainder were actively looking to make their first 
investment (Mason and Harrison, 2002)3.  
                                                 
3 While there is some evidence that angel investors learn from doing (Harrison et al, 2015), 
particularly from making their first investment, robustness tests excluding the 13% of (so far) non-
investors makes no material difference to the reported results. 
17 
 
 
Respondents were overwhelmingly male (124 out of 127, or 97.6%4) and middle-
aged (44% aged 45-54 and 25% aged 55-64, compared with 6% who were over 
65 and 25% who were under 45). They were also well-educated: 60% were 
university graduates (52% of whom had degrees in science, engineering or 
mathematics with the remainder having degrees in arts, social sciences and law5), 
24% had Masters degrees (16% had an MBA) and 6% had PhDs (all in science). 
Almost two-thirds of respondents had professional qualifications (often more than 
one); half of these respondents had finance-related professional qualifications. 
Just 11% reported no post-school educational qualifications.  
 
The economic background of the respondents was overwhelmingly business-
oriented, with most holding senior management positions in companies of various 
sizes. More significantly, the sample was very entrepreneurial: 70% had started 
one or more businesses (median of two start-ups), 19% had been involved in one 
or more management buyouts (MBO), 10% had been involved in at least one 
management buyin (MBI) and 12% had been involved in both MBOs and MBIs. 
In total, 83% of respondents had gained entrepreneurial experience in at least one 
start-up, MBO or MBI. Their expertise was multi-faceted, with most respondents 
                                                 
4 One questionnaire provided information for both husband and wife on the grounds that they 
invested together. 
5 A curious feature was that 10% of the graduates in the sample had degrees in history. 
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identifying several functional areas in which they had experience: indeed, 33% 
described their expertise as being ‘general management’, 32% gave sales and/or 
marketing, while 38% had finance-related expertise.6  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Their investment preferences were quite varied (Table 1). There was a strong 
preference for manufacturing, and technology in particular. In terms of stage, 
respondents exhibited the greatest preference for early stage investments 
(typically businesses that were revenue-positive), followed by start-ups and 
expansion stage deals. MBOs were also popular, although relatively few actual 
investments were made in such deals (Mason and Harrison, 2002). In contrast, 
angels had relatively little interest in either seed stage investments or 
rescue/turnaround situations.  
 
4.2 The Assessment of Risk by Business Angels  
Business angel investors were given 35 statements relating to sources of risk in an 
investment opportunity. They were asked to respond to each statement on a 5-
point scale (from +2 to –2) to indicate the degree to which it increased or reduced 
the risk of the investment.  For the purpose of analysis these statements have been 
                                                 
6 7% described their expertise was managing director and 4% gave Chairman. 
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grouped into three categories: (i) those that relate to the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur (motives, demographics, traits: n=14); (ii) those that relate to the 
experience of the entrepreneur/management team (track record, reputation, 
referral sources: n=7); and (iii) those that relate to the characteristics of the 
venture itself (product/service, market characteristics, location: n=14).  The first 
two categories relate to ‘jockey’ factors; the third category relates to ‘horse’ 
factors.  Responses have been analysed separately for factors associated with 
increased risk in the venture and those associated with a reduction in risk. 
Rankings are on the basis of mean scores on the 5-point scale, ignoring non-
responses, and have been grouped into very high (-1.50 to -2.00 for decreased 
risk; +1.50 to +2.00 for increased risk), high (-0.95 to –1.49; +0.95 to +1.49), 
medium (-0.50 to –0.94; +0.50 to +0.94) and low (0.00 to –0.49; 0.00 to +0.49) 
risk factors. These ranges were determined a priori but do correspond well to 
breaks in the distribution of mean scores (Table 2). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
From Table 2 it is clear that a combination of entrepreneur and venture 
characteristics are associated with increased perceived risk in the investment 
opportunity.  In particular, there is a high perceived increase in risk where the 
entrepreneur has a low financial commitment in the venture and where the 
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entrepreneur is seeking status through new venture ownership, and a moderate 
increase in risk associated with the age of the entrepreneur (a surrogate for 
experience and hence competence). In both cases, as sources of agency risk in the 
form of moral hazard and adverse selection, low financial commitment and status 
seeking are consistent with the argument that business angel investors will be 
concerned specifically with agency rather than market risks.  Typically, an 
entrepreneur will seek outside finance only after making significant investment to 
develop the venture to a point at which, first, outside investors can estimate its 
value; and second, where disclosure of critical aspects of the venture to investors 
will not result in the opportunity being appropriated (Smith and Smith 2000, 404-
405).  However, given that entrepreneurs and investors are rewarded differently 
(in that entrepreneurs provide largely human capital to and draw salaries from 
their ventures) there is an incentive for entrepreneurs to pursue negative NPV 
investments, even where there are no significant sunk assets in place, and seek to 
attract investors to these.  Table 2 clearly indicates that the entrepreneur’s 
financial commitment (or, more precisely, the lack of it) is a major signal to the 
investor as to the potential agency risk of adverse selection, and that status 
seeking by the entrepreneur signals a potential lack of commitment and effort by 
the entrepreneur, generating a moral hazard problem. 
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Table 2 also highlights a number of venture characteristics that are associated 
with at least moderate increases in the perceived riskiness of the investment: first, 
situations where the product will create a new market (i.e., the opportunity goes 
beyond the knowledge and experience of the investor, and represents a source of 
market risk which the investor cannot adequately assess or control); and second, 
where the product is high tech (reflecting the general lack of technology 
experience and knowledge in this sample of business angels).  These represent 
product/market risks which go beyond the competence of the investor to manage 
based on their experience and knowledge.   
 
The survey responses also confirm that distance is a significant factor in the 
perception of risk by business angels.  Most previous research on business angel 
investment preferences and behaviour has demonstrated that business angel 
investment is a proximity phenomenon  (Harrison et al, 2010): business angels 
variously report that they will invest in businesses which lie within, say, 100km of 
their home or office, or within a fixed travel time to allow for a working visit plus 
return travel within a day (e.g. Short and Riding, 1989; Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 
1994; Mason and Harrison, 1994; Paul, Whittam and Johnston, 2001).  This 
preference for proximity reflects, in part, the informal identification of investment 
opportunities through personal social and business networks which themselves 
tend to be spatially constrained.  In the present context, however, it also reflects 
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the need and desire of investors to be in a position to monitor and become 
involved in the management and development of their investee ventures, both 
because this represents “displaced” or vicarious entrepreneurial activity on their 
part, and also because proximity and involvement provides a mechanism for 
managing moral hazard.  Equity investors will share the benefits of any effort 
expended by the entrepreneur to make the venture more successful and hence 
valuable.  However, as Smith and Smith (2000: 405) point out, this sharing of the 
benefits is likely to reduce the efforts of the entrepreneur compared to the 
situation of being sole owner, as the entrepreneur weighs the overall cost of effort 
against only the private benefits to the entrepreneur, not against the total benefits 
to all investors, and therefore may make choices that are not in the best interests 
of investors (see also Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Interestingly, given its association with 
role conflicts within the family and between family and non-family members, 
inheritance/succession issues and differences in attitudes to equity investment 
(Colli, 2013; Neckebrouck, et al, 2017), family involvement/ownership is seen as 
a low increase in risk, and this remains a fruitful avenue for further research.  
 
In summary, the results shown in Table 2 confirm that business angel investors 
are concerned with and do seek to manage agency risks.  Entrepreneur 
characteristics (financial commitment, status seeking and age) are associated with 
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increased perceived risk, representing both adverse selection and moral hazard 
issues.  The venture characteristic most associated with moderately increased risk 
(distance from home/office) is also associated with efforts to minimise moral 
hazard problems.  Hypothesis 1, therefore, is broadly supported. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3, which summarises investor responses to factors that decrease the 
riskiness of an investment opportunity, provides further, but more equivocal, 
support for hypothesis 1.  With the exception of the almost tautological 
importance of investment risk being reduced by an entrepreneur who evaluates 
and reacts to risk, entrepreneur experience (prior familiarity with the target 
market, demonstrated prior leadership/management ability and a relevant track 
record) is associated with very high reductions in investment risk. In other words, 
investors seek to invest in ventures that are established by knowledgeable 
experienced entrepreneurs, confirming Fiet’s (1995b) conclusion that business 
angels rely upon the entrepreneur to manage market risk. This is reinforced by the 
importance attached to effort and financial commitment (as measures of the 
absence of moral hazard problems) and attention to detail as risk reducing.   
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A number of venture characteristics are also associated with a high reduction in 
the risk of the investment. These include issues that lie at the interface between 
venture characteristics and entrepreneur or investor characteristics, notably a 
balanced management team, and investor familiarity with the industry which are 
both associated with reductions in adverse selection problems. They also include 
product specific issues (demonstrated market acceptability, strong market niche, 
proprietary or other protection) which lie within the area of the experience and 
expertise of the investor. The implications of this for the nature of the due 
diligence process undertaken by business angel investors will be discussed below. 
 
Comparison with the attitudes of venture capital fund managers (Wright and 
Robbie, 1995), subject to the different measurement scales used in the two studies 
noted earlier, reveals both similarities and differences. All of the factors that 
business angels regard as producing a very high reduction in risk (Table 3) are 
assessed by venture capitalists as having a significant impact on the riskiness of 
the investment. However, low financial commitment of the entrepreneur and an 
entrepreneur who seeks status – which business angels regard as increasing risk 
(Table 2) – appear to be given much less emphasis by venture capitalists: this may 
in part be an artefact of the different measurement scales being used (which in the 
case of the Wright and Robbie (1995) study do not separate risk-increasing and 
risk-reducing factors), but they may also signal a contrast in attitude which can be 
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attributed to the differences in the relative ease that angels and venture capital 
funds can remove the entrepreneur. 
 
4.3 Due Diligence Activities 
Once an opportunity has passed through the investor’s initial screening filter, it is 
subject to a due diligence process of varying degrees of sophistication.  From 
Table 4 it is clear that business angel investors engage in a wide range of 
information seeking and appraisal procedures before committing to an 
investment: while the investment decision may indeed be subject to lower degrees 
of formality than that of, for example, the venture capitalist (Van Osnabrugge, 
2000; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000), business angel investors do 
nevertheless engage in significant systematic evaluation procedures.  Many of 
these are veracity checks, undertaken by the investor personally: almost all 
investors will always interview members of the management team, visit company 
premises and review the financials prepared by the company.  This is consistent 
with a focus on reducing or controlling agency risk.  However, the most 
significant aspect of the approach of business angels to due diligence is their 
reliance on information that they gathered themselves and limited use of third 
party sources (e.g. due diligence reports composed by accounting firms).  Around 
half of investors will always seek (informally rather than formally) expert opinion 
on the product/service and review the valuation of comparable companies, and 
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will extend the veracity checks to include contacting the venture’s financial 
advisors (bank, accountant) and actual and potential customers (market 
assessment). Library research, formal market research and formal technologies 
are among the least likely elements to feature in the due diligence process, 
confirming that business angel investors rely on their own background knowledge 
and experience to supply these elements. Thus, supporting hypothesis 2, the due 
diligence process of business angels relies for the most part on a personalized 
approach to information gathering and processing. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
4.4 Information Gathering To Value An Opportunity 
Given that the value of any investment depends on its ability to generate future 
cash flows (and on investor assessments of, and attitudes to, the riskiness of these 
future cash flows), valuation of a venture, in this case by a prospective investor, is 
subject to uncertainty due to the difficulties of determining future cash flows and 
setting an appropriate discount rate (to reflect risk) to estimate the present value 
of these future cash flows (Smith and Smith 2000: 228).  Two features of the 
business angel’s valuation procedures stand out (Table 5).   
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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First, there is a strong focus on the use of current and past information in 
determining the value of the investment opportunity.  This is reflected in the 
importance given in the rankings to cash flow data, the profit and loss account 
and, to a lesser extent, the balance sheet and management projections (one year 
ahead).  Management projections more than one year ahead are rather less 
important.  Only in the use of sales and marketing information is there any 
indication that future cash flows may, even indirectly, enter the valuation process. 
Consistent with the evidence on due diligence procedures reported above, 
relatively low attention is given to independent information generation in the form 
of due diligence by an accounting/consulting firm.  This is consistent with 
Granovetter’s (1985, 490) argument on the importance of personal knowledge 
based information over that acquired from a third party: ‘even better is 
information from one’s own past dealings with that person.  This is better for four 
reasons: (1) it is cheap; (2) one trusts one’s own information best – it is richer, 
more detailed, and known to be accurate; (3) individuals with whom one has a 
continuing relation have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to 
discourage future transactions; and (4) departing from pure economic motives, 
continuing economic relations often become overlaid with social content that 
carried strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism’ (see also 
Harrison et al, 1997).   
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Second, non-financial measures appear to be important in valuation of investment 
opportunities. For three-quarters of business angel investors in this study, 
interviews with entrepreneurs were of “vital importance” in preparing a valuation 
of the investment opportunity, and the curriculum vitae of the management and 
interviews with other company personnel also scored highly.  This is consistent 
with the importance given to these sources in the due diligence process (Table 4 
above).   
 
Venture capital fund managers rely on a similar range of information sources 
(Wright and Robbie, 1995). Indeed, venture capitalists place even more emphasis 
on their own due diligence report. However, consistent with expectations about 
the formalism of the information collection process, venture capitalists place 
relatively more emphasis than business angels on due diligence by 
accountants/consultancy firms and relatively less emphasis on interviews with 
management and company personnel. 
 
Overall, this evidence provides at least partial support for hypothesis 3: business 
angel investors do gather information on more than just entrepreneur-related 
issues (four of the top five factors identified in Table 5 relate to the horse not the 
jockey), but they do so primarily through their own efforts, rather than by using 
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independently generated information by third parties, chief among which is the 
interview with the entrepreneur and other members of the management team. It 
therefore appears that business angels do rely on the mediation of information on 
and from the entrepreneur/management team through the lens of their own 
experience, and this applies both to the due diligence process (forming a view on 
the “investability” of the opportunity) and, perhaps rather more surprisingly, to 
the valuation of the opportunity itself. Indeed, the investment opportunity is, in a 
sense, worth what the entrepreneur/management team is assessed by the investor 
to be worth. This analysis is subject to one important caveat. As the investment 
decision-making process progresses, the investor’s attention shifts from valuation 
(will this venture generate any value?) to price (how much should I be willing to 
pay for this high potential venture?). Valuation-based due diligence focuses on the 
jockey, horse and track, as discussed above; subsequent price-oriented due 
diligence focuses on the more detailed analysis of the findings and factors 
identified in Table 5. Exploring the type of due diligence done at each stage of the 
process remains a largely unexplored area for further research. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to contribute to the literature on the business angel 
investment decision making process by examining in detail for the first time their 
due diligence process in response for calls for more research into the various 
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stages of the investment process to ‘establish the impact of additional venture 
factors and entrepreneur behaviours during each stage of the interaction, the 
relationship between these factors and how these combine to influence … the 
investment decision itself’ (Maxwell 2016, 139). In so doing, we extend the 
conclusion reached by Fiet (1995a; 1995b) that business angels give more 
emphasis to agency risk than to market risk, and in so doing emphasise the 
assessment of the jockey rather than the horse. First, we show that business angels 
regard entrepreneur characteristics and experience as more significant influences 
than venture characteristics on the perceived riskiness of an investment 
opportunity. Business angels are therefore clearly betting on the “jockey” rather 
than the “horse” because, as one angel commented, “it’s easier to change the 
horse [business idea] than the jockey [entrepreneur]” (Paul, Whittam and 
Johnston, 2001: 13). Second, business angels rely for the most part on a 
personalised approach to information gathering and processing, rather than using 
third parties, in which the trustworthiness (Harrison et al, 1997) of the 
entrepreneur becomes crucial. Third, contrary to what might have been expected 
from the greater emphasis that angels give to agency risk, and from our findings 
on angels’ perception of the main sources of risk, angels do not restrict their 
information gathering to entrepreneur-related issues.   
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The wider implication of this study is to highlight the importance for 
entrepreneurs seeking capital from business angels of understanding the investor’s 
perspective.  Entrepreneurs must ensure that they send out the appropriate signals 
about their capabilities and intentions in all their dealings with the investor.  This 
goes beyond what is written in the business plan and conveyed in investor 
presentations.  The business plan persuades the investor of the attractiveness of 
the opportunity and can signal some aspects of the fit between the 
entrepreneur/management team and that opportunity (Collewaert 2012). However, 
the investor’s assessment of the capabilities, intentions, values and motivations of 
the entrepreneur/ management team are determined at the due diligence stage in a 
highly personalised and informal process.  Accordingly, entrepreneurs must pay 
attention to the signals they send out, because in the final analysis investors are 
relying on them to manage the market risk in the investment and thereby exploit 
the opportunity in a profitable way. 
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Table 1 Investment preferences of survey respondents 
 
 
Type of investment Mean score* 
Seed financing 2.57 
Start-up financing 3.25 
Early stage expansion financing 3.69 
Expansion financing for established firms 3.20 
Rescue financing 2.60 
Management buyouts 3.12 
  
Technology-based firms 3.41 
Manufacturing firms 3.64 
 
Notes. 
* Respondents were asked to indicate for each category on a one to five scale, 
with one denoting ‘no interest’ and five denoting ‘strong interest’. 
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Table 2 Factors increasing the riskiness of an investment opportunity 
 
Factor Reduces risk No 
effect 
on 
risk 
Increases 
risk 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2   
High increase in risk        
        
Entrepreneur has low financial 
commitment in venture 
(ENTCHAR) 
2 3 12 43 64 +1.32 0.867 
        
Entrepreneur seeks status 
(ENTCHAR) 
1 9 27 46 43 +0.96 0.955 
 
 
       
Medium increase in risk        
        
Investment located >2 hours from 
home/office (VENCHAR) 
1 4 44 49 25 +0.76 0.839 
        
Entrepreneur <30 years old 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
2 5 52 50 17 +0.59 0.828 
Venture will create new market 
(VENCHAR) 
 
6 22 18 51 27 +0.57 1.151 
Product is high tech (VENCHAR) 0 14 51 40 19 +0.51 0.884 
        
 
 
Low increase in risk 
 
       
Market is individual/household 
(VENCHAR) 
 
0 10 60 40 12 +0.44 0.779 
Market is mature (VENCHAR) 6 28 27 44 19 +0.34 
 
1.128 
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Venture seeking investors 
through a network (ENTEXP) 
 
1 17 72 24 11 +0.21 0.799 
Family involvement/ownership 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
4 27 49 30 13 +0.17 0.994 
Entrepreneur seeks security 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
6 40 28 31 20 +0.15 1.173 
Entrepreneur seeks to be 
independent (ENTCHAR) 
 
7 28 44 36 9 +0.09 1.011 
 
 
 
Notes: ENTCHAR  - entrepreneur/management team characteristic 
 
 ENTEXP  - entrepreneur/management team experience 
 
VENCHAR - venture characteristic (product, market,    
technology, location) 
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Table 3 Factors decreasing the riskiness of an investment opportunity 
 
Factor Reduces 
risk 
No 
effect 
on risk 
Increases 
risk 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
Deviation 
 -2 -1 0 +1 +2   
 
Very high reduction in risk 
 
       
Entrepreneur familiarity with target 
market (ENTEXP) 
 
95 26 4 0 0 -1.73 0.512 
Entrepreneur demonstrated leadership/ 
management ability (ENTEXP) 
 
83 39 3 0 0 -1.64 0.528 
Entrepreneur evaluates and reacts to risk 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
84 36 5 0 0 -1.63 0.559 
Entrepreneur has a relevant track record 
(ENTEXP) 
 
86 30 8 1 0 -1.61 0.664 
 
 
       
High reduction in risk 
 
       
Venture initiated by a team which is a 
functionally balanced management team 
(VENCHAR) 
 
66 47 11 0 1 -1.42 0.718 
Entrepreneur has major financial 
commitment to venture (ENTCHAR) 
 
70 39 8 0 4 -1.41 0.878 
Product can demonstrate market 
acceptance (VENCHAR) 
 
57 60 7 0 0 -1.40 0.595 
Entrepreneur capable of sustained intense 
effort (ENTCHAR) 
 
58 58 7 1 0 -1.39 0.633 
Entrepreneur gives attention to detail 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
59 54 7 2 1 -1.37 0.736 
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Product has strong market niche 
(VENCHAR) 
 
54 62 5 1 1 -1.36 0.676 
Venture in an industry investor is familiar 
with (VENCHAR) 
 
49 54 21 0 0 -1.23 0.717 
Product is proprietary or can be otherwise 
protected (VENCHAR) 
 
44 60 19 1 1 -1.16 0.763 
        
Medium reduction in risk 
 
       
Target market has high growth rate 
(VENCHAR) 
 
35 60 18 7 4 -0.93 0.969 
Entrepreneur articulate in discussing the 
venture (ENTCHAR) 
 
30 63 27 2 3 -0.92 0.854 
Familiar with entrepreneur’s reputation 
(ENTEXP) 
 
23 66 33 1 1 -0.88 0.736 
Investment located <1 hour from 
home/office (VENCHAR) 
 
32 46 43 2 1 -0.86 0.849 
Entrepreneur and investor have 
compatible personalities (ENTCHAR) 
 
30 44 44 5 1 -0.78 0.885 
Entrepreneur referred by trustworthy 
source (ENTEXP) 
 
23 59 37 3 3 -0.77 0.859 
Entrepreneur provides good references 
(ENTEXP) 
 
18 57 48 1 1 -0.72 0.744 
Entrepreneur known to the investor 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
28 43 40 10 3 -0.67 0.989 
Entrepreneur seeks to be wealthy 
(ENTCHAR) 
 
29 48 31 11 6 -0.66 1.073 
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Low reduction in risk 
 
       
Markets primarily to other businesses 
(VENCHAR) 
 
14 40 61 6 1 -0.49 0.792 
Potential for overseas sales (VENCHAR) 
 
15 44 43 17 3 -0.42 0.987 
 
Notes: ENTCHAR  - entrepreneur/management team characteristic 
 
 ENTEXP  - entrepreneur/management team experience 
 
VENCHAR - venture characteristic (product, market, 
technology, location) 
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Table 4 Due diligence activities by business angels for investment 
opportunities passing their initial screening 
 
 Always 
  [3] 
Sometimes 
     [2] 
Never 
  [1] 
No 
response 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
Deviation 
Activity       
       
Interview members of management 
team 
114 7 3 3 2.90 0.379 
Tour company premises 108 13 4 2 2.83 0.453 
Conduct in-depth review of financials 
prepared by company 
106 13 5 3 2.81 0.483 
Have informal discussions with 
experts about the product/service 
59 56 10 2 2.39 0.634 
Contact firm’s accountant 59 45 17 6 2.35 0.715 
Contact current/potential customers 57 48 18 4 2.32 0.717 
Make a confidentiality agreement with 
the company 
49 59 15 4 2.28 0.667 
Contact the firm’s bankers 55 41 24 7 2.26 0.772 
Investigate the market value of 
comparable companies 
49 54 19 5 2.25 0.708 
Contact entrepreneur’s former 
business associates 
36 70 16 5 2.16 0.635 
Agree an exclusivity period with the 
company 
30 66 25 6 2.04 0.676 
Conduct in-depth library work 33 55 30 9 2.02 0.733 
Contact other private investors for 
their opinion 
29 66 28 4 2.00 0.683 
Contact the firm’s suppliers 24 73 26 4 1.98 0.640 
Contact firm’s solicitors 27 57 36 7 1.92 0.724 
Contact competitors 12 73 34 8 1.82 0.596 
Obtain formal market research study 14 65 38 10 1.79 0.637 
Obtain formal technology study of 
product 
12 60 48 7 1.70 0.643 
Solicit opinion of other companies in 
investor’s portfolio 
6 48 63 10 1.51 0.596 
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Table 5 Types of information used by business angels when preparing 
a valuation of an investment opportunity 
 
                                               Importance [1 = ‘no importance’; 5 = ‘vital importance’]  
Type of information 1 2 3 4 5 No 
reply 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Interviews with entrepreneurs 2 1 8 18 96 2 4.64 0.776 
Cash flow 3 2 8 24 86 4 4.53 0.881 
Profit and loss account 3 4 9 40 67 4 4.33 0.929 
Sales and marketing information 2 2 15 39 65 4 4.33 0.873 
Product information 2 2 16 37 67 3 4.33 0.881 
Interviews with other company 
personnel 
1 3 19 39 61 4 4.27 0.869 
Curriculum vitae of management 3 6 16 30 69 3 4.26 1.019 
Own due diligence report 6 5 11 30 69 6 4.25 1.105 
Balance sheet 3 8 9 41 62 4 4.23 1.007 
Audited accounts 3 5 16 33 63 7 4.23 1.002 
Management projections (one year 
ahead) 
3 3 22 34 60 5 4.19 0.982 
Unaudited management accounts 6 7 22 25 62 5 4.07 1.169 
Technical information on production 
capabilities 
2 8 24 43 43 7 3.98 0.991 
Management projections (more than one 
year ahead) 
6 17 33 35 32 4 3.51 1.160 
Due diligence by accounting/consulting 
firm 
16 22 39 26 20 4 3.10 1.251 
Trade journals 11 29 41 34 6 6 2.96 1.044 
Other private investors 21 30 32 30 10 4 2.82 1.215 
Statistical and information services 27 32 35 23 5 5 2.57 1.150 
Financial press 24 32 48 11 6 6 2.53 1.065 
Government industry statistics 30 42 34 13 2 6 2.30 1.104 
 
 
 
